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ABSTRACT 
Thanks to the foresight of our Founding Fathers we are required by law to redraw 
legislative boundaries every ten years, after the decennial census. These boundaries create 
districts at both the state and federal legislative level, and there are many guidelines which 
govern how districts can be drawn in order to provide for fair competition and accurate 
representation. Population distribution is key to how electoral districts are drawn at all 
levels. In recent decades, increasing concentrated populations of Democrats in urban areas 
and decreasing population in rural, more Republican areas has made it harder to draw 
competitive districts at the congressional level. There is evidence to support that this 
geographic polarization is being driven by citizens themselves, making choices of where 
to live based upon their lifestyle and ideology. This concept of self-sorting has been termed 
“unintentional gerrymandering” (Chen and Rodden 2013). This trend of “self-sorting” has 
been caused by many factors, all of them stemming from a larger movement of generational 
change. Intentional gerrymandering, that which is done by powerful incumbent legislators, 
is a known problem in political science. Unintentional gerrymandering, the way that 
geographic population shifts are affecting legislative and congressional districts in the same 
way, is a much less developed and affirmed concept. My research question addresses two 
areas that are missing from the current discussion of political geography and redistricting. 
The first asks how geographic population distribution (rural vs. urban) affects the amount 
of wasted votes in an election cycle, specifically looking at Congressional elections. The 
second is to test whether the efficiency gap is an effective formula to measure how wasted 
 vii 
votes are affected by population shifts within congressional districts between redistricting 
cycles. 
To do this I examine a sample of urban and rural congressional districts to compare 
the number of wasted votes from the 2012 election cycle (which took place after 2010 
redistricting was in effect) to the 2018 election cycle (which is the last available election 
data before 2020 redistricting will begin).  
I find that the number of wasted votes in rural districts in 2012 is significant and 
decreases slightly when looking at the 2018 election results. The effect was smaller and 
not statistically significant in urban districts when using the 2012 data, but the results in 
2018 were much more significant. Supportive of the concept of unintentional 
gerrymandering, the population shifts from 2012 to 2018 resulted in more wasted votes in 
the districts which I measured.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“We have built a country where everyone can choose the neighborhood most 
compatible with his or her lifestyle and beliefs” 
-Bill Bishop, The Big Sort 
 
The apportionment of representatives to the states was such a foundational piece of 
our government that it is included in the very beginning of the Constitution. In Article 1, 
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America, the founders lay out how and 
when the census and subsequent apportionment should take place; “The Number of 
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have 
at Least one Representative” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 2). 
In the defense of the Constitution, the authors of the Federalist Papers, specifically 
James Madison, felt it important to address the issue of counting citizens of the new nation 
and apportioning representation accordingly; “To the People of the State of New York: The 
remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is 
grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time 
to time, as the progress of population may demand.” (Madison n.d.). We don’t construct 
our political arguments quite as eloquently as Madison did here in Federalist Paper No. 58, 
nor do we have one Congressional representative for every 30,000 people. One thing that 
hasn’t changed is the counting of all people by the federal government every ten years, and 
apportioning representatives to the states after that. However, the average size of each 
district is approximately 700,000 people, more than twenty-three times what the founders 
had written in the Constitution (Burnett 2011). 
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The founders intent was for population to be equal between congressional districts. 
However, they could not have conceived of and didn’t include, a mechanism to have other 
qualifications and guidelines when drawing Congressional districts. Because of this, many 
maps are drawn simply on the basis of population size without taking other factors into 
account. Since this time there have been additional requirements and guidelines created, 
including the need for districts to be compact and contiguous, and additional criteria 
regarding racial minorities (Civil Rights Act (1964)). These criteria exist to ensure that 
districts are representative of the people who live in them. When these requirements and 
guidelines aren’t followed or are bent to give advantage to one party or person over the 
other, the result is a district which has been intentionally gerrymandered. 
The practice of gerrymandering is as old as the Constitution of the United States 
and is one of the most talked-about problems with our political system today. It is often 
blamed for everything from partisan gridlock in Congress to uncompetitive elections, and 
long-term policy consequences (both nationally and in the states). However, not everyone 
agrees that gerrymandering is the culprit for these problems in our political system. 
“Despite a lack of direct evidence, partisan gerrymandering has become one of the prime 
suspects in the investigation in to what killed moderation and bipartisanship in American 
politics” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2009). Modern American politics are fraught 
with increased polarization, uncompetitive elections, and legislative gridlock. Social 
scientists and researchers are constantly looking for ways to explain why these things are 
happening and recommend possible solutions. One of the most common culprits found 
responsible for all of these things is gerrymandering. However, it’s not just 
gerrymandering, I’m going to complicate an already messy issue and add an extra adjective 
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here; intentional gerrymandering. Intentional gerrymandering refers to a deliberative effort 
on the part of those controlling the redistricting process to favor one person, party or group. 
What if the cause of America’s political woes (or at least some of them) is not actually 
vindictive state legislators, but instead the result of actions of the constituents themselves? 
One option is that the culprit is not intentional gerrymandering (at least not by itself), but 
something called unintentional gerrymandering.  
Gerrymandering often occurs when legislators are responsible for drawing their 
own districts. Many state legislative chambers are controlled by Republicans (in recent 
redistricting cycles), and there has been a proven tendency for gerrymandering to benefit 
that same party (McCarty et. al, 2009). There is strong evidence to suggest that intentional 
gerrymandering helped the Republican Party gain congressional seats after the 2010 
census; “various analyses have concluded that the Republican Party gained between 20 and 
28 seats in the House between 2012 and 2016 due solely to gerrymandering” (Kean, 2018).  
The most common type of gerrymandering is intentional, where district maps are 
drawn to benefit an incumbent, certain party or racial group (Chen and Rodden, 2013). 
Having a large number of wasted votes is usually a sign that a district has been 
gerrymandered for partisan advantage. In fact, that is what the Efficiency Gap formula was 
originally designed to measure. The efficiency gap was developed by Nicholas 
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee in 2015 as a way to measure extreme partisan 
gerrymandering (Veomett, 2018). It’s a simple formula that takes the total number of 
wasted votes from the surplus (all votes for the winning candidate, past what was needed 
to win) and the losing votes (all votes cast for the losing candidate). What if intentional 
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gerrymandering was not the only culprit for increased partisanship and a lack of 
competitiveness? 
In their piece discussing political geography and electoral bias, Chen and Rodden 
introduce the term “unintentional gerrymandering”. They define the term as follows; 
“Unintentional gerrymandering, whereby one party’s voters are more geographically 
clustered than those of the opposing party due to residential patterns and human 
geography” (Chen and Rodden, 2013). This supports Bishop’s (2009) work regarding 
self-sorting at the neighborhood level. Chen and Rodden have done the most work 
regarding this concept, but more research is needed.  
The goal of this research is to determine what effect, if any, shifts in geographic 
population distribution has on the amount of wasted votes in Congressional elections. This 
research adds to existing research in the field by examining a randomized selection of 
congressional districts and comparing the number of wasted votes from the 2012 election 
cycle to the 2018 election cycle in rural districts and doing the same in urban districts. It 
also tests the efficiency gap standard in a new way, by using it to test for an unintentional 
gerrymander, rather than an intentional one. 
Given the trends and existing evidence, if a shift in population is causing an effect 
on the number of wasted votes, we would expect to see a smaller effect in the 2012 data, 
and a larger effect in the 2018 data.  In addition, I would expect to find more wasted votes 
in both rural and urban congressional districts in 2018 than in 2012. This is because after 
reapportionment and redistricting in 2010-2011, the maps in 2012 should be fairly 
balanced. Whereas, we would expect there to be a larger imbalance eight years after the 
census, from these natural geographic population shifts over time. This would prove that 
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the districts start from a fair and balanced place after the census and redistricting and are 
moving to be more unbalanced over time, before the lines are redrawn in the following 
census.  
These expected relationships are only partly confirmed. I find consistent significant 
results in the 2012 and 2018 rural data sets and statistically significant results in the 2018 
urban data. The results for the 2012 urban data are significant. The effect is larger in the 
2018 data when looking at urban districts, but not rural ones.  
If intentional gerrymandering causes polarization and/or a lack of competition, 
could this also be true for geographic population shifts? We can see from the results that 
population shift in both rural and urban districts causes an increase in wasted votes, which 
according to the efficiency gap standard is the same problem as gerrymandering. Rural 
districts are geographically larger, more politically heterogenous and moderately 
Republican (Chen and Rodden, 2013). More wasted votes in rural districts mean that there 
is a stronger Republican bias. More wasted votes in urban districts mean the same for 
Democrats.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The practice of apportionment following a decennial census is largely 
uncontroversial. The Apportionment Act of 1911 set the limit of the House of 
Representatives at 435 (History, Art and Archives 2019). This has increased the population 
per district since this time, with the average district size after the 2010 census being set at 
approximately 700,000 people. After each census, states which have had large gains in 
population receive additional seats, taken from states which have diminished in population. 
The more contentious part happens after the apportionment, when districts need to be 
drawn.  
Redistricting is like the much more controversial sister to apportionment. 
Redistricting is a power that was left to the states by the Constitution. The vast majority 
of states use their state legislatures to draw the new districts, but in recent years there has 
been a trend for the responsibility to go to a commission (either independent or politically 
appointed). Approximately twenty states have commissions (or a backup commission) 
that helps to draw the new maps.  
Although they were not explicitly written in to the Constitution, there are many 
requirements that legislatures and commissions must take into account when drawing 
districts. The first is that the districts within a state must be roughly equal in size. They 
must also be compact, contiguous and keep communities of interest (neighborhoods, 
minority communities) together (Redistricting Criteria n.d.). The Voting Rights Act also 
created redistricting requirements which were aimed at protecting racial minorities 
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(History, Art and Archives n.d.). Compactness is also a requirement, but is often at odds 
with some of the other thresholds because an odd or ugly district isn’t necessarily a 
gerrymander, and in fact might be the best possible district in terms of competitiveness or 
representation (Tausanovitch n.d.).  
In the 1960s the United States went through what has since been termed a 
“Reapportionment Revolution” in which the Supreme Court heard multiple cases related 
to redistricting. Many of the requirements related to drawing districts emerged from the 
decisions handed down in this time period (Cox and Katz, 2002).  
The most controversial element of redistricting is, of course, gerrymandering. 
Gerrymandering is as old as the Constitution itself. In 1789, a year after the Constitution 
was ratified, Patrick Henry of Virginia used his power as a state legislator to draw a 
congressional district which made James Madison compete against James Monroe. 
Elbridge Gerry, who was a signatory of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Governor of Massachusetts, used his political power to sign an 1812 map into law which 
had been so horrendously drawn that it was made to resemble a salamander by a local 
journalist. Gerry, who would later become the Fifth Vice President of the United States, 
approved (though it should be noted he didn’t draw it) and signed the bill (Trickey, 
2017). The term gerrymander has been in Webster’s dictionary since 1864 and has been a 
common political practice since then as well (Trickey, 2017). Chief Justice John Roberts 
has even spoken publicly about partisan gerrymandering being a problem since the 
country began but has withheld the Court from participating judicially in the issue. 
“Partisan gerrymandering is nothing new. Nor is frustration with it…The Framers were 
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aware of electoral districting problems [and assigned] the issue to the state legislatures.” 
(Labunski, 2019). What can be done about the problem of partisan gerrymandering?  
The issue of gerrymandering is so well-known and has been so unpopular with the 
American public and there is a large, grassroots, reform movement in the United States to 
try to tackle the problem. States across the U.S. have seen ballot initiatives, petitions, the 
creation of independent commissions, and many, many legal actions against partisan 
gerrymandering in recent decades. But can such proposed reforms fix these problems? 
We need to fully consider all possible causes, both intentional and unintentional 
gerrymandering, before that can be determined. Although intentional, partisan 
gerrymandering is often the phenomena focused on when discussing wasted votes in a 
district, geographic population shifts are also to blame. We are sorting ourselves 
geographically into ideologically like-minded neighborhoods. Partisanship and ideology 
have been increasingly overlapping in recent decades, with the term “conservative” 
becoming aligned with the Republican party and “liberal” with Democrats (Abramowitz 
and Saunders 1998). These “sorted” neighborhoods, make up cities, which make up 
counties and are then drawn into ideologically like-minded Congressional districts. Based 
on this I would then expect that there would be effects of unintentional gerrymandering 
(i.e. we find that population has an effect on wasted votes) in rural areas in every election 
cycle, because many districts would have been drawn in favor of Republicans, but urban 
areas will show more significant effects in the election cycles that come toward the end 
of the decade after population has shifted and clustered in urban areas. I would also 
expect to find, based on previous research, that there is a larger overall effect in urban 
areas due to the clustering of like-minded voters in densely populated districts.  
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In 2019, the Supreme Court all but closed the door on partisan gerrymandering 
cases altogether. In a decision handed down from two consolidated cases (Rucho v. 
Common Cause, No. 18-422, and Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726), Chief Justice John 
Roberts wrote in his majority opinion that; “We conclude that partisan gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts,” (Liptak, 2019). 
However, not everyone agreed with Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Kagan wrote in her 
dissent that; “The practices challenged in these cases imperil our system of government,” 
she said. “Part of the court’s role in that system is to defend its foundations. None is more 
important than free and fair elections.” (Liptak, 2019).  Because of this, state-level 
reforms by activists might be the only recourse left to affect positive change in regards to 
partisan gerrymandering. The obstacle of justiciability isn’t the only thing facing anti-
gerrymandering activists. Geographic population shifts are another big problem in being 
able to draw districts that are conducive to free and fair elections. 
The creation of the efficiency gap measure was like an answered prayer for many 
activists who were fighting for redistricting reform. It was seen as an answer to Justice 
Kennedy’s request for a workable standard to measure partisan gerrymandering (Howe 
n.d.). The key to the efficiency gap is looking at wasted votes. The efficiency gap 
standard has been used by attorneys and political scientists to quantify and prove partisan 
malintent in gerrymandering cases from Wisconsin to North Carolina. As with anything, 
the efficiency gap also has its critics. Other researchers and mathematicians have come 
up with competing measures and publicly point out the flaws of using this formula to 
measure partisan gerrymandering (Bernstein and Duchin, 2017). A main critique is that 
it’s too simple and doesn’t get at the complexities of intentional partisan gerrymandering. 
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Although it can (and likely will) be used for challenges in the lower courts, the efficiency 
gap isn’t living up to its full potential. What if the efficiency gap could be used to 
measure wasted votes for other political phenomena?  
While an extensive amount of research has been done about intentional 
gerrymandering, few studies have focused on unintentional gerrymandering. Concepts 
such as population sorting have been studied for other reasons, including the loss of 
civic/community life (Putnam, 2000) and homogeneity in populations (Bishop and 
Cushing, 2009), but this study looks specifically at the effects of population sorting on 
wasted votes in Congressional elections. Many studies look at a more micro level, 
looking only at counties in a single state (Kinsella, McTague and Raleigh, 2015) or 
neighborhoods (Bishop and Cushing, 2009), or an older time period (Nall, 2015). “The 
use of electoral districts to examine cleavages in society is relatively common in the 
literature; a large body of work attempts to identify such divisions using partisan voting 
and direct democracy voting” (Kinsella et al., 2015). Other scientists have tried to 
identify if the concepts displayed in Bishop’s book “hold water” statistically (Abrams and 
Fiorina, 2012), this study is another attempt to identify that. All of the research discussed 
here fits into the larger field of political geography. 
What do I mean by “geographic population shifts”? Specifically that population in 
urban areas is growing and population in rural areas is declining. For decades, population 
in urban areas has been growing at a sharp rate, while population in rural areas has been 
declining. As a result, over half (fifty-three percent) of the U.S. population now resides in 
the top fifty urban areas (cities with a million or more people) (Teixeira, 2008).  
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How does this correspond to an increase in wasted votes in congressional 
elections? In addition to population being sorted into these rural and urban areas, strong 
partisanship is associated with each area. Ideologically liberal or those who identify as 
Democrats have tended to cluster in urban areas, while those who are ideologically 
conservative or identify as Republicans live disproportionately in rural areas. “American 
political behavior unquestionably divides along income, religion, gender, race, age, and 
geographical fault lines.” (Fisher, 2014). Urban areas are almost always Democratic 
voting hot spots. There is a strong relationship between partisan composition and 
population density, with a decline in density equating to a decline in Democratic voting 
(Teixeira, 2008). By population shifting from rural to urban areas, we are left with like-
minded Republican populations in rural areas and Democratic groups in urban areas. 
Unlike in the latter half of the 20th century, suburban areas aren’t growing rapidly 
(although they  remain one of the biggest battleground areas – but that is a story for 
another time) (Walter, 2019).  
The first half of the 20th century saw population shifts to cities resulting from an 
increase in craft production and assembly line labor. In the decades after World War II, 
American citizens were increasingly moving to the suburbs (Teixeira, 2008).  Even with 
population being increasingly concentrated in the suburbs, competitiveness in elections 
wasn’t seen as a big problem. Presidential elections (by state) in both 1960 and 1976 
were closely contested. “And in both of those elections all of the most populous states 
were closely contested including California, New York, Illinois and Texas” (Abramowitz 
and Saunders, 1998). In the latter half of the 20th century, geographic population sorting 
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took the form of social specialization and increasingly homogenous neighborhoods (in 
both urban and rural areas).  
The reasons for these large shifts are many and include historical changes, 
generational change, increased minority populations, shifting white population, increased 
levels of educational attainment and changes in infrastructure (specifically highways). 
Generational change, especially the millennial generation, are one of the biggest effects 
on shifting population- specifically widening the urban vs. rural divide (Dure, 2014). 
Rural areas are suffering from a decreased birth rate because younger generations are 
seeking out urban areas for opportunities to live and work.  
Millennials, the largest generation, which makes up 30 percent of the voting age 
population, differs in many facets of life from previous generations (Fry, 2018).   Along 
with this generational change has come a shift in traditional gender roles. From 1972 
until today; “the proportion of married couples that both work outside the home has risen 
from 32 to 52 percent.” (Teixeira, 2008). In conjunction with being more populous in 
urban areas, millennial and unmarried voters are more likely to be Democratic voters 
(Teixeira, 2008).  
Generational change is also tied closely to another factor which is affecting 
population shift, increased immigrant populations (Teixeira, 2008). It is evident from exit 
polling and census data that the share of minority populations making up the electorate 
(especially the 18-45 age group) is continuing to grow. According to exit polling from the 
2008 election “African-Americans made up 15 percent of voters under the age of 45. 
Hispanics and other nonwhites made up 19 percent of voters under the age of 45 
compared” (Abramowitz, 2010). Black, Asian and Hispanic minority groups are all 
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strong Democratic voting blocs. This is supported by looking at demographics of eligible 
votes in blue and red states. “Eligible voters in solid blue states are 34 percent minority, 
while in solid red states they are 26 percent minority” (Teixeira 2008). Although minority 
populations are on the rise, it is the pattern in where people are living that is changing and 
becoming more alike. The country as a whole is becoming more diverse, but 
neighborhoods are more homogenous.  
One of the consequences, as evidenced through the measure of wasted votes, is 
electoral competitiveness. In 2000 the vote margin between candidates George W. Bush 
and Al Gore in Florida was 0.00921%. 527 votes separated the two, with the winner 
becoming President of the United States (Blomquist, 2000). Decades prior in 1974, a 
Senate race in New Hampshire had a vote margin of 0.000901%, with only 2 wasted 
votes. Only five congressional elections (House and Senate) have had a less than 1% vote 
margin since 2000.   
14 
 
 
 
Table 1 U.S. Congressional Districts with a less than 1% vote margin from 
2000-2018. 
 
These low-margin elections demonstrate a high level of electoral competition. “In 
the competitive 1960 and 1976 elections, for example, there were far more closely 
contested states and far fewer landslide states than in recent presidential elections” 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). In addition to having large margins of wasted votes 
many of these elections are won by incumbents. A startling statistic; “99% of incumbents 
standing for reelection were successful in the 2002 and 2004 elections.” (McCarty et al. 
2009). A consequence of geographic polarization is that there are far more landslide 
states now than there were decades ago. This is true for presidential as well as 
congressional elections. Anyone who looks at a blue and red map of presidential election 
results can see that there are partisan groups of voters, clustered together around the 
country. It’s why the map looks red in the middle and blue on the outskirts.  
 
Year 
 
District 
 
Margin 
 
Margin Votes 
Total Votes Cast (for 
Winner) 
2000 Washington 
Senate 
0.09301% 2229 1,199,437 
2002 Colorado 7th 
CD 
0.07403% 121 81,789 
2006 Connecticut 
2nd CD 
0.0342% 83 121,248 
2008 Minnesota 
Senate 
0.01287% 312 1,212,629 
2014 Arizona 2nd 
CD 
0.07343% 161 109,704 
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Bill Bishop focused his research in The Big Sort on the question of why this 
geographic polarization was happening and the factors that are causing it to worsen. His 
explanation? A phenomenal he entitled The Big Sort. Bishop’s argument is that 
Americans are sorting not just along racial, economic or religious divides, but a larger all-
encompassing ideological divide. He suggests that all of these other demographic factors 
feed into this ideological separation, this “Big Sort”. This sorting is driven by two main 
factors; “one is the growth of “a politics of self-expression,” where partisan divisions in 
the public are increasingly driven by social, cultural, and consumer identities (Bishop 
2009). The second is “the geographic dimensions of this division have been fueled by 
economic mobilization” (Bishop and Cushing 85). These factors came together to create 
a situation in which we choose to live among those who are ideologically like-minded 
and aligned on a partisan basis. “We have built a country where everyone can choose the 
neighborhood most compatible with his or her lifestyle and beliefs” (Bishop and Cushing 
40). This is a common phenomenon that has been studied in other disciplines besides 
political science. “Sociologists and psychologists refer to the clustering of people with 
like-mindedness and/or similar backgrounds (sorting) as homophily, or simply that “like 
attracts like” (Kinsella et al. 2015).  Lifestyle preference is the largest factor of this, but 
this lifestyle preference is only achievable through the causes of population shifts that 
have been mentioned previously (generational change, educational attainment, change in 
traditional gender roles, etc). To measure how Americans are living in ideologically like-
minded areas, Bishop uses presidential election return data. “Americans are increasingly 
living in communities and neighborhoods whose residents share their values and they are 
increasingly voting for candidates who reflect those values.” (Bishop and Cushing, 2009).  
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Although I use Bishop’s book, The Big Sort, to inform and support much of the 
basis for my argument, I don’t endorse whether his stance on neighborhood sorting is 
making us more or less polarized, but rather conclude that sorting is indeed a 
phenomenon that is occurring in congressional districts (including multiple 
neighborhoods and cities and in some instances, multiple counties) and that its effect is 
evident in declining congressional election competitiveness. For this specific research, 
I’m less concerned with the problem of political discourse and more concerned with the 
aggregated voting behavior and possible implications.  
The main consequence of the sorting Bishop describes is that people who live in 
like-minded neighborhoods and communities won’t encounter disagreement or differing 
points of view through conversation with their neighbors (Bishop and Cushing, 2009). 
One of the biggest criticisms of intentions behind The Big Sort focuses on this point. The 
most noted, vocal, critics of Bishop’s work are Samuel Abrams and Morris Fiorina 
(2012). Their criticisms are largely based around the claims that the geographic 
population sorting affects, and is affected by, a lack of interaction and conversation 
between neighbors. Although they take issue with the listed consequences (and some of 
the empirical methods) of The Big Sort, Abrams and Fiorina do not disagree with the 
outcome or concerns these findings hold for democracy.  “We agree that such behavior is 
highly problematic for democratic politics, and if realized, a matter of serious concern.” 
(Abrams and Fiorina, 2012). The biggest critique of Bishop’s methods are that 
presidential election return data is limiting and doesn’t give the whole picture. This could 
also be a critique of the research here, and an idea that will be explored more later on is 
the need for data at a more localized level to really get at the idea of residential 
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polarization. I take issue with Abrams and Fiorina’s critique. Insinuating that geographic 
population sorting by ideology can only have a strong effect if neighbors are having in-
person political conversations, is ignoring the effect it can have on electoral 
competitiveness, the redistricting process and all other issues discussed herein. There is 
strong research to support the claims that Bishop makes. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
have done work in this field and have found that geographic polarization has grown along 
with Congressional polarization and other modern problems including income inequality 
(Nall, 2015, McCarty et al., 2006).  
Chen and Rodden, the creators of the term “unintentional gerrymandering” find 
through their research that; “the highest levels of electoral bias against Democrats occur 
in states where Democratic voters are most concentrated in urban areas” (Chen and 
Rodden, 2013). And we see this bias in everything from presidential and congressional 
elections, to state legislative elections as well. In recent decades, the more rural parts of 
the South and West have become solidly Republican, while the Northeast and West Coast 
have become strongly Democratic in voting behavior (Hopkins, 2010).  
As discussed previously, gerrymandering has been a problem since shortly after 
the Constitution was ratified in 1788. Racial gerrymandering was a large problem in the 
Civil Rights era and partisan gerrymandering has been a problem in recent decades. 
Geographic population shifts are creating a similar problem, sorting like-minded or 
demographically similar people into one area, but this problem is endogenous and 
discussed much less. One way to measure partisan gerrymandering is the efficiency gap, 
which looks at how many wasted votes were cast in an election. Using this measure, a 
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district where more than eight percent of votes are wasted is considered to be 
gerrymandered.  
The efficiency gap is a straightforward equation that was created to fulfill Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s request for a manageable standard by which to evaluate partisan 
gerrymandering claims in the courts. There are two kinds of wasted votes; losing and 
surplus (Veomett, 2018). The losing vote refers to all votes cast for the losing 
candidate(s). The surplus vote refers to all votes for the winning candidate past the fifty-
plus-one needed to win. “From a party’s point of view, a vote is wasted in one of two 
cases. Democrats who vote in districts that lean heavily Republican are wasting votes, 
since they’re supporting losing candidates. But Democrats who vote in heavily 
Democratic districts are also wasting votes, since every vote beyond the one that clinches 
the majority doesn’t contribute to the victory” (Kean, 2018). Of course, in real life, no 
districting plan will have an efficiency gap of exactly 0. So, how high is too high? 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee argue that corresponds to a historically robust threshold for 
unacceptable partisan gerrymandering (Bernstein and Duchin, 2017). The efficiency gap 
judges that a district is gerrymandered if the wasted vote percentage is higher than eight 
percent. In a two-party system like the United States, bias emerges when one party has a 
more concentrated amount of voters in one district (Chen and Rodden, 2013). Having a 
large number of wasted votes means that the district is biased to be more responsive to 
one party over another.  This could be the case if the district was gerrymandered but if it 
was drawn fairly the percentage of wasted votes should be below eight percent, according 
to the efficiency gap’s creators- Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee (Veomett, 
2018).  
19 
 
 
 
In a study looking at Wisconsin’s State Assembly, Krasno, Magleby, McDonald, 
Donahue, and Best, find; “Further investigation reveals important measurement 
characteristics of the efficiency gap that renders it a dubious metric with which to detect 
and weigh gerrymanders for the results it yields may vary widely depending on the 
election used and overall competitiveness of the state” (Krasno et al., 2018). Even critics 
don’t dismiss it entirely, but it can’t be used as a standalone method to measure 
gerrymandering (Kean, 2018). This will be discussed in more detail in the “future 
research” section later.  
To address my second research question, I attempt to determine if the efficiency 
gap can be used to measure wasted votes caused by unintentional gerrymandering. I 
expect that the efficiency gap can be used to measure the effect of population shifts on 
wasted votes. I also expect that there will be a larger effect the farther away in time from 
when redistricting took effect. This is a new use for the measure, which has not been 
tested before. If the proper control variables are used, the efficiency gap should work to 
measure the effect of population shifts on wasted votes. Establishing an alternate use for 
the efficiency gap could be the baseline for future avenues of work which use the 
efficiency gap to measure other concepts besides partisan gerrymandering.  
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METHODS 
What effect does this demonstrated geographic population shift have on the 
amount of wasted votes in an election? I will use the efficiency gap to measure how 
wasted votes are affected by population shifts within congressional districts between 
redistricting cycles. For this research I focus specifically on rural and urban congressional 
districts. I also use a time series analysis to compare the 2012 election cycle to the 2018 
election cycle, with the expectation that there will be a larger effect on wasted votes in 
2018 due to shifting population over time, before redistricting occurs again at the end of 
the decade.  
There was no existing data set which contained the information I needed, within 
the parameters of my research design. I therefore created a data set from scratch. Using 
an interactive map of the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) data I compiled 
population and area (square mile) for every congressional district, and then calculated 
population per square mile. That list was separated into four quartiles based on the 
calculation of people per square mile1. The first and second quartiles contained the most 
rural districts. Quartile three was suburban and quartile four contained all of the urban 
districts. 
                                                 
1 After completing the list, but before separating into quartiles, I removed the congressional 
districts which were not applicable to this research. Those are as follows; American Samoa, 
Guam, Northern Mariana Island, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.  
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Defining “rural” was challenging as definitions at the federal level vary across 
agencies. I reviewed fifteen different definitions of rural before choosing to use the 
Department of Veteran’s Affairs definition. This measure was chosen because, of the 
federal definitions I was able to find, it was one of only two that used the calculation of 
people per square mile to define the category. I also used the Veteran’s Affairs definition 
of “urban” which is; areas that have “a density above 1,000 people per square mile” (The 
Washington Post, 2013). 
I chose to create my own quartiles for this research as most available data 
regarding urban and rural areas are done at the county level, but because congressional 
districts cross county lines I was unable to use existing data. Suburban districts have been 
removed from this data 2 because my research question purposefully excludes suburban 
areas.  The scope of this research is focused solely on urban and rural districts, mainly to 
show a comparison of the Democratic and Republican bias that exists in each, but also 
because including suburban districts complicated the intent. There is research suggesting 
that suburbs are now the most competitive regions in the country, which is interesting but 
unfortunately falls outside the scope of this research (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2002). A 
research design including (or focused on) suburban districts would require its own 
research design to fully control for all effects. 
After removing those districts which were classified as suburban, the rural and 
urban districts were then separated into two separate sheets. Because this data sheet was 
created in Microsoft Excel, I used an excel formula (random_number) to assign random 
                                                 
2The definition I selected did not strictly account for a definition of suburban, so I 
designated those districts with 500-1,000 people per square mile as being suburban.  
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numbers to all remaining districts. I then sorted these random numbers from smallest to 
largest and chose the first thirty districts in each sheet (rural and urban)3. Creating a 
random sample of districts is important to the implications of the findings of this 
research. We can more likely generalize and apply the findings if the sample is 
completely random.  
The final rural data set contained twenty-seven observations and the urban data 
set contained thirty-one. The sample size of the rural data set ended up being smaller than 
the urban data set because some districts needed to be removed4. Some states are only 
apportioned one representative, the minimum amount guaranteed by the Constitution, and 
these districts are considered “at-large”. A few at-large districts were included in the 
random sample of rural districts selected for this research but were removed because the 
control variable used to look at gerrymandering in a given state didn’t apply. This design 
uses a small sample because of the scope of the design was built around having a random 
sample. Because the sample was selected randomly from a larger pool of all 435 
congressional districts, we can safely assume that the effects shown are representative of 
both rural and urban districts throughout the country.  
 
                                                 
3 Although the districts were chosen completely randomly, the urban data set includes 
districts of notable Democrats including Adam Schiff (CA 28), Nancy Pelosi (CA 12), 
Ilhan Omar (MN 5) and Rashida Tlaib (MI 13). 
4 North Carolina 9 was originally included in the rural data set, but in February of 2019 the 
North Carolina State Board of Elections ordered a new election in this Congressional 
District. Because the election return data for 2018 was considered invalid I removed this 
district from the sample. 
23 
 
 
 
The dependent variable for these models is wasted votes, which was calculated 
using the efficiency gap formula. The use of this was designed to test whether the 
formula could be used to measure other concepts in political science, in addition to the 
concept of partisan gerrymandering which it was designed to measure. The efficiency gap 
formula is as follows: 
 
Efficiency Gap = (Total Democratic Wasted Votes – Total Republican Wasted 
Votes) ÷ Total Votes 
 
(source: The Brennan Center) 
 
As explained previously, the Efficiency Gap is used to measure wasted votes. Table 2 
below shows an example of the amount of wasted votes cast each in a rural (Kentucky 2) 
and urban district (California 13) across the two election cycles studied.  
 
Table 2 Examples of wasted vote calculation between two districts. 
 Wasted 
Votes 
Party #1 
Wasted 
Votes 
Party #2 
Total Wasted 
Votes 2012 
Wasted 
Votes Party 
#1 
Wasted 
Votes Party 
#2 
Total 
Wasted 
Votes 
2018 
Kentucky 2 
(RURAL) 
141134.5 
 
 
40,374 
 
129,915 128673.5 
 
43,027 
 
122,991 
California 
13 
(URBAN) 
144292 
 
106,144 
 
144,290 147419.5 
 
113,161 
 
147,418 
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The main independent variable is the total population of each congressional 
district. It is important to note that I use population as a whole, and not voting eligible 
population, voting age population or the population of registered voters.  
Controlling for incumbency is important as incumbency can have an effect on the 
outcome of elections, a phenomenon known as the incumbency advantage, though the 
strength of the incumbency advantage has decreased in recent years and is debated 
among some scholars (Landsman, 2017). There can also be an electoral effect when an 
incumbent chooses not to run again. This can be attributed to the sentiment towards an 
incumbent’s party being negative, which would create a natural decline in the vote share 
for that party (Cox and Katz, 2002). In the data set, I controlled for incumbency by 
recording 1, if an incumbent won in that district in that election cycle, and 0 if other (i.e. 
an incumbent ran but lost or an incumbent did not run).  
To account for the partisan lean in a given district, I also included the Cook 
Political Report’s Partisan Voter Index score in the models. This measure is used as a 
proxy for previous vote margin, which was either unavailable or difficult to include for 
all districts. Districts which were Democratic leaning were given positive scores, while 
Republican leaning districts were given negative scores to create an ordinal variable. For 
the 2018 data, I used the 2017 Cook Political Report, which covers the 115th Congress 
and includes results from the 2016 election. I paired the 2012 data with the report 
covering the 113th Congress. This incorporates data from the 2004 and 2008 presidential 
election results.  
The next control variable was an attempt to control for turnout. To do this I 
looked at other races on the ballot and used gubernatorial elections as a proxy for other 
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races which might have influenced turnout in each cycle. To create this measure, I looked 
at whether a gubernatorial race was on the ballot for each state in each election. This was 
converted into a binary variable with 1 = yes and 0 = no.  
The next control variable included aims to assess whether a state’s congressional 
districts were gerrymandered. It is important to control for intentional gerrymandering 
here so that we can attempt to isolate the effects of unintentional gerrymandering. To do 
this I include the Polsby-Popper measure of compactness for each state.  Although there 
are multiple measures which can indicate whether a district has been gerrymandered, the 
Polsby-Popper measure was the most popular measure in the research I cite. This 
measure is actually a ratio which measures the area of the Congressional district 
compared to the area of a circle, the circumference of which is equal to the perimeter of 
the district. In the Polsby-Popper measure, a high ratio indicates that a state is less 
gerrymandered, while a low ratio indicates that a state is more gerrymandered. The basic 
idea is that the district should be able to fit inside a circle with the same perimeter, if it 
cannot do this it is less compact (having a low ratio) and thus more likely to be a 
gerrymander. The biggest criticism of this measure is that it does not take state and 
natural boundaries into account. This could give a false ratio/score for districts which 
geographically are less compact owing to the physical landscape of the district. 
Alternative measures which could be used in a future model include; the Schwartzberg, 
Area/Convex Hull and Reock ratio, all of which are similar and measure area and 
compactness.  
Party control is a binary variable indicating if a party other than the Republican or 
Democratic Party was the second highest vote getter in a given election. In almost all the 
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districts in the sample, Democrats and Republicans constituted the first and second 
highest vote getters. In elections where this was not the case, a notation was made in the 
data set. For a full list of these exceptions please see Appendix A.  
The final variable is included to account for racial makeup of the districts. I use 
American Community Survey data which includes the percent of Non-Hispanic White 
population in each district. Although there are various limitations with all of these 
measures, together they ultimately provide a strong picture of the effect of unintentional 
gerrymandering. 
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RESULTS 
Table 3 shows the results of a linear regression model of the 2012 data for the 
rural congressional districts. The coefficient for the population variable is 0.412. This is a 
significant result, telling us that for every additional 2.4 people in a district, there is an 
additional wasted vote in a given district. The p-value, at 0.019, is also statistically 
significant. I’m confident (98.1%) with that p-value that the results displayed here are 
statistically different from zero. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis and safely 
assume that there is an effect between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional 
elections. Specifically, there is an increase of one wasted vote for a growth of two and a 
half people in a district. As population increases, so does the amount of wasted votes. The 
variable of “Race” is a key control variable, as racial makeup is key to mapmakers when 
drawing districts, especially under the Voting Rights Act.  
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Table 3 Comparison of 2012 and 2018 Elections Results for Rural 
Congressional Districts 
   
Variables 
2012 Election 
Results 
2018 Election 
Results 
   
Population 0.4127977 .253 
 (0.019)** (0.021)** 
Incumbent Won 2090.079 16942.07 
 (0.873) (0.268) 
Partisan Voter Index 1116.838 -339.1169 
 (0.023) (0.492) 
Gubernatorial Race 842.0291 19335 
 (0.941) (0.143) 
Gerrymander (by 
state) 
-1408.119 
(.036) 
-717.2987 
(0.320) 
 
  
Party Control 7003.946 -23654.75 
 (0.691) (0.210) 
Race 614.923 635.9966 
 
(.055)* 
 
 
(.087)* 
R-squared 0.4987 0.4024 
Observations 27 27 
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
It is worth noting that the rural districts in this sample are largely conservative, 
which is consistent with other research and knowledge about voting patterns in rural 
areas. The Republican candidate won in twenty-three of the twenty-eight districts in the 
2012 election cycle.  This is consistent with expecting some Republican bias, as existing 
literature would support, in the redistricting cycle that occurred in 2010.  
The coefficient for population in the 2018 election model is .253, which is lower 
than the coefficient for the model using 2012 data. As we would expect, this is a 
significant result, telling us that for every additional four people in a district, there is an 
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additional wasted vote in a given district. The p-value, at 0.021, is also statistically 
significant. I’m confident (97.9%) with that p-value that the results are statistically 
different from zero5. Consistent with the 2012 results, we find further support that there is 
a relationship between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional elections. As 
population increases, so does the number of wasted votes.  
Just like in the 2012 cycle, the Republican candidate also won in twenty-three out 
of the twenty-eight districts in the 2018 election cycle. Population is declining in rural 
areas, which is evident when comparing the 2012 results to the 2018 results in the Table 
3. In 2012 it took only 2.5 people to produce one wasted vote, where in the same districts 
in 2018 it took four people to create the same effect.   
                                                 
5 The P-value is higher than in the 2012 results, it still meets the 95% threshold needed.  
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Table 4 Comparison of 2012 and 2018 Elections Results for Urban 
Congressional Districts 
    
Variables 
2012 Election 
Results 
2018 Election 
Results 
      
Population 0.28502 .324 
 (0.280) (0.000)*** 
Incumbent Won 52905.95 -7403.065 
 (0.123) (0.448) 
Partisan Voter Index -1121.285 925.1055 
 (0.172) (0.029) 
Gubernatorial Race -619.5982 19514.87 
 (0.985) (0.042) 
Gerrymander 
133.4207 
(0.930) 
-873.1986 
(0.176) 
 
  
Party Control 32979.47 18358.16 
 (0.319)                   (0.210) 
Race 676.6433 1124.486 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.000)*** 
R-squared 0.2582 0.6361 
Observations 31 31 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the linear regression models for the urban districts. 
Like the previous models, the dependent variable is wasted votes. The coefficient for 
population is .285 in the 2012 election. As population increases by 3.5 people, there is an 
additional wasted vote in a given district. However, this is not a statistically significant 
result (p=0.280), so we cannot be confident in the value of the coefficient. This effect is 
also less significant than the effect found in the model for rural data in 2012. This is 
notable because it shows that there was less of an effect from wasted votes after 
redistricting took place in 2011. Consistent with the geographic population trends 
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discussed previously, the Democratic candidate won twenty-six out of the thirty-one 
races in the 2012 election cycle.   
The coefficient for population increases to .324 in the 2018 election. A population 
increase of 3 people in any given district would thus predict an additional wasted vote. 
The p-value, at 0.000, is statistically significant. We can be confident with that p-value 
that the results displayed here are statistically different from zero and thus are significant. 
We can therefore reject the null hypothesis and safely assume that there is a relationship 
between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional elections in urban districts 
for the 2018 election cycle. In 2018, thirty of the thirty districts were won by the 
Democratic candidate, which is why it is important to control for party in the models 
above.  
Consistent with the overall findings, the variable for race was significant in the 
rural data sets in both election cycles, but only significant in the urban data in 2018. 
Thus, there is a strong correlation between the percentage of the population which is 
white and the number of wasted votes in an election cycle. Because the population shift 
has increased the population in urban areas it was consistent with my expected findings to 
have a more significant effect in 2018. However, it was surprising that the results in 2012 
were not statistically significant (even for a small effect). When considering the rural 
districts, the effect in 2012 was larger than the effect in 2018. This is likely because the 
districts were drawn to Republican advantage after the 2010 Census and redistricting 
cycle, and because population shifted away from rural areas in the time between election 
cycles. Thus, it takes fewer people to create more wasted votes in 2012 and more people 
to create the same wasted vote in 2018, prior to the new census and redistricting cycle 
32 
 
 
 
taking place. To be absolutely sure of this result we should replicate the model using 
2020 data when available. However, using the existing data one can see that the results in 
the models above are statistically significant so we can be sure that there is an effect of 
population shifts on wasted votes in rural Congressional districts. These results support 
the idea that there is geographic polarization happening across districts in between 
redistricting cycles. The effects of population on wasted votes were significant in 2018 
for urban districts and not in 2012, and, given that redistricting didn’t occur in this time, 
this is suggestive that these results could be due to geographic polarization.  
 However we know that based on these results, we can see that in 2018 in rural 
districts it would take about four people to create an additional wasted vote, vs the three 
that it would take to create the same wasted vote in an urban district. This tells us that 
there is a positive effect of population changes on wasted votes in both rural and urban 
congressional districts, but that this effect is larger in rural areas. Just like intentional 
gerrymandering, unintentional gerrymandering also has a bias for Republicans. Large 
population shifts between 2012 and 2018 contributed to more wasted votes. Given the 
small sample it is impressive that the results were statistically significant, the 
implications of this significance will be discussed further in the following section.  
Before discussing the content and context of these results and the implications, 
which arise from them, it is important to note that the second research question was tested 
and answered here. The Efficiency Gap formula is effective in not only calculating the 
number of wasted votes in each district, but as a part of these models it gives us 
statistically significant results when looking at the effect of population shifts on wasted 
33 
 
 
 
votes. Although it will undoubtedly still have critics, it can and should be used as a 
variable in other scientific research within the field of Political Science in the future.   
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DISCUSSION 
My research questions address two areas that are missing from the current 
discussion of political geography and redistricting. The first, is whether the efficiency gap 
is an effective formula to measure how wasted votes are increased by population shifts 
within congressional districts between redistricting cycles. The second, is to examine the 
effect of geographic population distribution (rural vs. urban) on the amount of wasted votes 
in an election cycle. I find that population shifts have a significant effect on wasted votes 
in rural districts in both the 2012 and 2018 election cycles, and in the urban districts in the 
2018 election cycle. The effect is larger in the urban district than the rural district when 
comparing significant results from the 2018 data.  
This research adds to existing research in the field by examining a randomized 
selection of congressional districts and comparing the number of wasted votes in rural 
districts to that in urban districts. It is a meaningful test of the efficiency gap standard to 
measure something besides intentional, partisan gerrymanders. It adds data to the field of 
political geography and gives a good baseline to be able to expand a similar research 
design to incorporate additional time periods (both past and future). It also supports the 
research done by Bill Bishop and Robert Cushing in The Big Sort (Bishop and Cushing, 
2009). The increase in wasted votes connected to population in three of the four models, 
in addition to the high percentage of a single party consistently winning election in the 
districts from our random sample, are further evidence of geographic population shifts 
exhibiting a self-sorting pattern in America. Comparing the 2012 results to the results 
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from 2018, we see that there was a larger effect in the rural congressional districts, 
indicating that these districts were drawn biased in favor of Republicans. Likewise we 
can interpret the results of the 2012 election cycle for the urban districts to show that 
there was no effect in 2012, the effects were statistically significant, and that these 
districts were drawn more fairly, without bias. The results in 2018, however, show that 
population has a large effect on wasted votes. The effects seen here are impressive, 
especially given the small sample size used. This adds strength to the case that 
geographic polarization and sorting is happening at a significant level, and that the results 
here could be generalized and applied to all districts.  
In finding support for the theory that population shifts have an effect on wasted 
votes, we have to consider the difficult question of what comes next. How do we create a 
solution to the problem of unintentional gerrymandering?  The grassroots reform 
movements among the states might not be the proper solution to this new problem. One 
idea, an idea that would be a major change from the current American electoral system, is 
to introduce new requirements for redistricting and to possibly remove or alter older ones. 
Future research should help to inform possible solutions.  
Representation is the key to democracy in the United States, specifically 
representation which is driven by geographic distribution of voters across legislative 
districts (Chen and Rodden 2013). For districts in which the percentage of votes 
unequally translates into seats, or districts in which a large number of wasted votes occur 
this creates a problem of bias.  “Studies of electoral bias typically flow from the 
normative premise that in a two-party system, a party with 50% of the votes should 
receive 50% of the seats.” (Chen and Rodden, 2013).  
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Although I generally find support for the findings discussed here, it is important 
to acknowledge the limitation of methods. There are potential critiques of almost every 
measure included in the models, including, but not limited to: the efficiency gap, Polsby-
Popper and partisan voting index.  
Although it was outside the scope of this research, looking at population flows 
from rural counties to urban counties between states would be an ideal way to expand 
upon this research and further identify how geographic population shifts can have an 
effect on wasted votes. This would help us identify not just how urban areas have grown 
and rural areas have shrunk in overall population, but also how people are moving from 
rural areas to urban ones and tie this to ideology, partisan and/or lifestyle choices.  
I also worked on a limited time series, studying two election cycles within one 
period of redistricting. Future studies should also expand the time series part of this data, 
going farther back in time and into the future to gather more electoral cycle data over 
time. This will help substantiate the claims made herein and be able to expand upon the 
effects of redistricting.  
Another idea for future research, one which came up as a critique from multiple 
other researchers, was the idea that data at the presidential or congressional level is too 
high level to truly identify the problem. For this reason, replicating the study with data on 
a smaller scale could help to support and diversify how these findings can be generalized. 
“Few studies tackle electoral analysis at a micro-scale due to both methodological 
difficulties associated with data collection and frequent precinct boundary changes.” 
(Kinsella et al. 2015). Finally, increasing the sample size by either taking a bigger 
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sample, say fifty congressional districts instead of thirty would help to further support the 
validity of these findings.  
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CONCLUSION 
Narratives, like those which occurred in Florida and New Mexico in the Presidential 
election of 2000 might be a thing of the past. Americans are sorting themselves into 
ideologically homogenous geographic clusters – which limits how redistricting can work 
in our electoral process. Some of the biggest unanswered questions in this field are; If 
liberal Democrats move to urban areas and those who identify as conservative Republicans 
stay in rural ones, how can we ever draw a balanced and competitive map? How do we 
ensure that representation is fair and equal?  
If voters who identify as Democrats continue to cluster and homogenize into 
urban areas, they will create a long-term disadvantage for the Democratic party- based on 
the way our electoral system currently functions. “Traditional districting principles of 
contiguity and compactness will generate substantial electoral bias in favor of the 
Republican Party”(Chen and Rodden, 2013). Even in the absence of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering, there is a clear effect of population shifts increasing wasted votes in 
both rural and urban areas. This is the same effect as what we see from intentional 
gerrymandering, a larger amount of wasted votes. Ultimately, because of this geographic 
clustering it will be even more difficult to draw a random, representative map.  
Past scholars have taken sharp positions in favor (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro and 
Rohde, 2007) and against (Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning, 2006; McCarty et al., 
2009) the hypothesis that gerrymandering affects polarization in the House of 
Representatives, and scholars have also examined the impact of gerrymandering on the 
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incumbency advantage (Friedman and Holden, 2009). Other studies have analyzed the 
effect of racial gerrymandering and the relationship it may have to existing electoral bias 
(Chen and Rodden, 2013). The efficiency gap measure may only be a starting place in the 
journey to measure the effects of partisan gerrymandering (both intentional and 
unintentional). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled in early 2019 that they would not 
rule on future partisan gerrymandering cases.  
The implications of this research are varied and unfortunately, incomplete. We 
can always do more, examine on a broader level and dive farther back to offer more 
support. But from the results we can see that population shifts do have an effect. The 
biggest takeaway from this research is that we need to spend time measuring, 
investigating and studying the effects of unintentional gerrymandering with the same 
focus and intensity that we use to understand and combat intentional gerrymandering. 
Controlling for intentional gerrymandering within a state allows us to see the effect that 
change in population between 2012 and 2018 has on the amount of wasted votes in an 
election.  
The results of this research suggest that the problem may be more complicated than 
what current redistricting reforms are trying to solve. Unfortunately, in some areas, this 
geographic, unintentional gerrymandering might be too severe for independent 
commissions and other proposed redistricting reforms to have much of an impact. Existing 
reforms are based on the assumption that corrupt politicians are drawing the district lines 
solely for partisan advantage, and that human geography plays no significant role in 
generating electoral bias. If Democrats move to urban areas and Republicans stay in rural 
ones, how can we ever draw a balanced map? 
40 
 
 
 
One possible solution to this problem which is worth exploring further, is to 
change, at the federal level, the requirements for drawing districts. A more extreme 
solution would be to make changes to the American electoral system, making it more 
proportional. One proposal for proportional representation is to create multimember 
House districts with ranked choice voting (Yglesisas, 2018). 
While there are not concrete solutions to these problems, in fact more questions 
than answers have been generated from this research, the results discussed here give us a 
good baseline to know that there is an effect of population shifts on wasted votes and that 
it is something we should continue to measure with new data generated from past 
elections but also in upcoming elections (2020) and after the next round of redistricting 
(2021) from the new census. Similar to intentional partisan gerrymandering, this might 
not be a completely solvable problem, but rather something American voters understand 
as a constant challenge to our democratic processes and something we can spread 
awareness of, and then work to fix where and how we can.  
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APPENDIX A 
Races in which a candidate belonging to a third party (not Democrat or Republican) 
was the first or second highest vote-getter.
49 
 
Table 5 Data Set: Rural 2018 
State District Vote Share Party 
California 2 42,044 No Party 
Georgia 8 564 Write-In 
Massachusetts 1 58,166 Blank 
Votes 
 
 
Table 6 Data Set: Rural 2012 
State District Vote 
Share 
Party 
Georgia 8 0 No votes 
were recorded for 
any other party.  
Massachusetts 1 70, 422 Blank/Void 
Texas 19 28,824 Libertarian 
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Table 7 Data Set: Urban 2018 
State District Vote Share Party 
California 13 34,257 Green 
Party 
Massachusetts 7 28,966 Blank 
Votes 
New York 16 42, 982 Blank 
Votes 
 
 
Table 8 Data Set: Urban 2012 
State District Vote 
Share 
Party 
California 13 38, 146 No Party 
Preference  
Massachusetts 7 41,199 Independent  
New York 7 29, 692 Blank/Void 
New York 13 40, 718 Blank/Void  
 
